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The focus of this article is on exploring the evolution of best 
practices for developing international cybersecurity legal 
frameworks.  The article posits that due to the nature of the 
problems to be addressed, international legal responses to 
cybersecurity should be developed in an on-going process whereby 
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they are first deconstructed and approached in a modular fashion, 
and then integrated or re-integrated as consensus and political will 
develop.  In a brief phrase, a dynamic “bottom up” approach 
should be used.  Among the problems with taking a comprehensive 
approach (or “top down” approach) to cybersecurity legal 
frameworks is that the term “comprehensive” means all things to all 
people.  The meaning varies depending on the physical, 
educational, and economic resources available in different 
jurisdictions.  It differs depending on the sensitivity of the data to 
be protected and needs to reflect different cultural expectations 
and priorities, among many other factors.  In addition, it must be 
recalled that the whole area of cybersecurity is both a relatively 
recent development as well as one that is notoriously in 
technological flux.  While there is a continuing need for 
systematizing (and legal frameworks are simply a type of system), 
the very nature of cybersecurity resists systematizing or at least 
requires regular re-systematizing as the underlying reality alters 
with equal regularity. 
Accordingly, while this article does not attempt to define 
“cybersecurity” as a unitary concept, it does propose a hopefully 
deeper understanding of the issues comprising cybersecurity 
through a modular approach.  This article first looks at the 
landscape of the current causes of, and threats to, cybersecurity.  In 
doing so, this article looks not only at what those threats are, but 
also looks at weaknesses “in the system” that may be exploited by, 
or that might exacerbate, those threats.  This article then looks at 
the main component parts (modules) of cybersecurity (critical 
infrastructure protection, privacy, cybercrimes, institutional 
matters, etc.).  It then looks at the current developments involving 
international responses and cooperative efforts with respect to each 
of the substantive areas (modules) and at recent attempts in the 
international sphere at addressing cybersecurity legal frameworks 
incorporating those developments.  It concludes with some 
recommendations for a way forward. 
I. CYBERSECURITY IS A GROWING CONCERN 
In recent years, cybersecurity has become a major and 
expanding concern of governments and the private sector around 
the world.  There has been a major shift in consciousness stemming 
from a variety of sources, including: 
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• Increased appreciation of how critical the Internet and its 
resources are in multiple spheres of human endeavor and how 
many infrastructures and systems are increasingly dependent 
on Internet connectivity and capacity; 
• Continuing disclosures of major data breaches at financial 
institutions, other corporations, government agencies, and 
academic institutions globally;1 
• Continuing releases of malware and the increased 
sophistication of those deployments;2 
• Continuing reports of varying levels of governmental 
monitoring and filtering (or censorship) of Internet use and 
content; 
• The cyber-attacks on key national infrastructure in Lithuania, 
Estonia, Georgia, and other countries and on the databases of 
major global business corporations;3 
• Concerns with governmental and corporate espionage; 
• Increased concern over cybercrime, including online fraud, 
identity theft, child pornography, theft of intellectual 
property, and related criminal money flows on the Internet; 
and 
• Privacy concerns with corporate and governmental data access. 
As the reach of the Internet continues to scale past a quarter 
of the world’s population and given the apparent sporadic user 
awareness on implementation of security protocols, systems 
operating on the Internet are often perceived as soft targets to a 
range of persons and entities.  These include criminal enterprises, 
“hackers” (whether for financial gain or as a challenge), cause-
based groups, proxies for governments, and governments 
(including their military and intelligence agencies).  Motives for 
 
 1. See, e.g., ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; to Pay $10 Million in 
Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 26, 2006), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm (describing settlement of 
data security breach by ChoicePoint); Eric Dash, Data Breach Could Affect Millions of 
TJX Shoppers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19
/business/19data.html (describing data breach at retailer T.J. Maxx). 
 2. Examples of malware include Confiker, Sutxnet, and the Zeus trojan. 
 3. The seriousness of this concern is highlighted by the report NATO 2020: 
ASSURED SECURITY; DYNAMIC ENGAGEMENT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
GROUP OF EXPERTS ON A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR NATO (2010), available at 
http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf.  The report recommends 
changes in the NATO Strategic Concept to specify the characteristics of a cyber-
attack that would trigger the obligation of collective response under Section 5 of 
the NATO treaty.  Id. 
4
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the attacks range from financial gain to the advancement of 
national security interests, to the satisfaction of peer recognition, 
and to the advancement of various causes.4 
Cybercrime and cyber-war have obvious direct negative effects 
on economic activity and, in fact, may intend such effects in the 
case of cyber-war.  Cyber-defense can have similar direct negative 
effects, if only because of its high cost and the information 
inefficiencies due to deliberate isolation of networks and databases 
from one another.  However, there are a number of situations in 
which information security has less obvious negative effects that 
reflect the tensions that are the subject of this article.  For example, 
recent developments involving the BlackBerry service of Research 
in Motion (RIM) and demands by the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Saudi Arabia, and India have uncertain effects on the 
ability of businesses and various professionals to meet their legal 
obligations regarding trade secrets and confidential business 
information.5  It has been recently reported that the UAE’s 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority has the key for 
BlackBerry services and can decrypt and monitor BlackBerry 
communications after obtaining a court order and that RIM has 
reached a similar agreement with authorities in India.6 
In terms of an evolving cybersecurity legal framework, there 
are a number of evident vulnerabilities and impediments to 
effective international cooperation.  Many of these were discussed 
in more depth at the Workshop.7  Among these are: 
 
 4. The recent phenomenon of cause-based “leak sites,” such as Wikileaks 
and Openleaks, adds a new dimension to these issues.  See Wikileaks, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/w/wikileaks
/index.html (last updated Apr. 25, 2011). 
 5. See Vikas Bajaj, India May Soon Resolve BlackBerry Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
18, 2010, at B4, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/business/global
/18rim.html?_r=1&ref=research-in-motion-ltd; Kevin J. O’Brien, Saudis Relent a Bit on 
Shutting Down BlackBerry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, at B2, http://www.nytimes.com
/2010/08/11/technology/11rim.html?ref=research-in-motion-ltd. 
 6. See SANS NewsBites: Dec. 14, 2010, SANS, http://www.sans.org/newsletters
/newsbites/newsbites.php?vol=12&issue=98 (last visited Feb. 17, 2011); Adam 
Schreck, UAE, BlackBerry Resolve Dispute, Averting Ban, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8, 
2010, 10:58 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20101008
/blackberry-crackdown. 
 7. See Internet Governance Forum Workshop, Legal Aspects of Internet 
Governance: International Cooperation on Cyber-security, in Vilnius, Lithuania 
(Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/component/chronocontact
/?chronoformname=WSProposalsReports2010View&wspid=123 [hereinafter 
Workshop]. 
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• Dissonance in national approaches to cybersecurity.  Different 
countries, even members of the same regional organizations, 
can take different approaches to the concept of cybersecurity 
in terms of national policies, laws, and implementation.  Some 
countries see Internet governance as having state security at its 
core, by which they mean that the State can know exactly who 
sent and received every transmission, every transmission’s 
traceroute, and the contents of every transmission; it can 
delete, block, and/or seize any transmission of which it 
disapproves; and it can punish efficiently those who send or 
receive unapproved transmissions.  At the other end of the 
spectrum are countries and organizations that strongly believe 
that proper Internet governance, including Internet security, 
must be integrated and balanced with the type of freedoms 
protected by instruments such as the First, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, 
the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, and 
numerous United Nations human rights documents.8  This 
“dissonance” can lead to a lack of effective coordination and 
can result in part because of a lack of multi-stakeholder 
participation in both policy-making and legislation. 
• Policy and implementation incoherence.  Even within countries 
there can be a disconnect between upstream policies 
promoting an “e”-agenda and the downstream protections of 
rights and property. 
• Outdated legal architecture that does not fit cyberspace well.  
Cybersecurity is a twenty-first century problem that requires 
twenty-first century responses.  However, in the legal sphere, 
many concepts developed in an analog era simply do not apply 
in a digital era or they cause friction when applied.  For 
example, the lack of consensus on the fundamental and 
related issues of jurisdiction and sovereignty make it difficult 
to effectively cross borders to address international 
cybersecurity incidents.9  A nation state may view its 
 
 8. See generally Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on 
Internet Freedom at The Newseum (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.state.gov
/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm; Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, 
Remarks on Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices & Challenges in a Networked 
World at George Washington University (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.state.gov
/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm (discussing the importance of Internet 
freedom). 
 9. Jurisdiction is used in the sense of the legal capacity to make laws 
6
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sovereignty as being impaired if another nation state may 
exercise “jurisdiction” within its borders.  However, nation 
states may view their sovereignty as being enhanced if by 
mutual agreement they obtain jurisdiction within each others’ 
territories.  In order for the rule of law to prevail, the inherent 
cross-border nature of cyberspace seems to require such 
agreements for the mutual expansion of jurisdiction. 
• Buggy code, bad practice.  Although it may be obvious, the fact 
that cybersecurity issues may arise from faulty (or “buggy”) 
software code, simple human error, and sloppy behavior while 
using the Internet merits mentioning in this panoply of causes 
of cyber-insecurity.10  Legal systems have not developed a 
consensus on addressing responsibility for offering such code 
in the marketplace.  It is often left to contract law and, 
frequently, the software developer writes the exculpatory 
software license.  However, if the licensee has sufficient market 
power, the licensor may be exposed to significant contractual 
and tort liabilities for defective code. 
• Existing tools and instruments are not fully applied or are only 
partially implemented.  Another source of vulnerabilities in the 
existing cybersecurity legal frameworks results from failure to 
apply the terms of existing instruments or only partial 
implementation of such instruments.  Legal systems are 
increasingly responding to this source of vulnerability by 
establishing liability for failure to implement existing 
cybersecurity tools in a manner proportional to the sensitivity 
of the data held.  This liability may be imposed because 
proportional security mechanisms were not employed as 
promised or regardless of whether a promise was made.  
However, this liability is often imposed on a case-by-case basis 
and not pursuant to statutory or regulatory requirements 
aimed at the particular issue.11 
 
applicable to particular persons and events within a territory and to compel legal 
process and enforcement of laws with respect to such persons.  Sovereignty is used 
in the broader sense of the total independent power of a nation state. 
 10. For a more thorough discussion of “buggy code” and the cybersecurity 
problems caused both by it and simple human error, see Andrew McLaughlin, Remarks 
at the International Cooperation on Cyber Security Workshop (Sept. 15, 2010),  
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/component/content/article/102-transcripts2010
/661-123 [hereinafter Transcript]. 
 11. See, e.g., In re Dave & Busters, Inc., No. C-4291, 2010 WL 2453892 (F.T.C. 
May 20, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823153
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II. A MODULAR APPROACH TO THE MAIN THEMES OF 
CYBERSECURITY 
The cybersecurity themes covered in this article are outlined 
below.  This thematic analysis to cybersecurity allows and lends 
itself to a modular approach to the issues covered.  As will be 
demonstrated in this article, there is good international practice in 
many of the themes covered, but there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach; every country addresses “cybersecurity” slightly 
differently.  Deconstructing cybersecurity along these thematic, 
modular lines—rather than attempting to identify one all-
encompassing, comprehensive model—also allows for greater 
selectivity when crafting the legislative responses to policy choices.  
In addition, disaggregating the issues that comprise cybersecurity 
lends itself to a better understanding of cybersecurity issues, and 
therefore to the ability to respond to them.  In some cases this 
disaggregation is done in a layered fashion.  In that vein, network 
security (the infrastructure layer) could be distinguished from both 
protocol security (the software layer) and from applications 
security (the applications layer).  Cyber-threats can be in the form 
of cyber-attacks, but can also be the result of “mistakes” or even 
natural disasters.  Similarly, responses can be viewed as preventative 
(ex ante) or loss-minimization (ex post).  Even among ex post 
responses, there are at least two types: emergency fixes (loss 
prevention) and forensic analysis.  New paradigms in international 
law such as shared responsibilities of states to ensure cybersecurity 
emerge from this analysis. 
At the same time, it is important to recognize that a 
cybersecurity legal framework needs to have an internal logical 
consistency; the bits and pieces need to work together.  The 
modular and layered approach allows national policy-makers and 
 
/100608davebustersdo.pdf (ordering Respondent to establish and implement an 
information security program); see also FTC Agreement Containing Consent Order 
In re Twitter, Inc., No. 092-3093, 2010 WL 2638509, at *9 (F.T.C. June 24, 2010), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923093/index.shtm (providing 
documents related to the FTC’s complaint against Twitter for failure to safeguard 
consumer information); Marc S. Martin, Henry L. Judy & Lauren Bergen Pryor, 
FTC Settles with Twitter—More Painful Lessons in Basic Data Security, K&L GATES (July 
1, 2010), http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/Detail.aspx?publication=6517; 
Twitter Settles Charges that It Failed to Protect Consumers’ 
Personal Information; Company Will Establish Independently Audited Information Security 
Program, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 24, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010
/06/twitter.shtm. 
8
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legislators to tailor specific approaches to particular problems.  It 
also allows policy-makers and legislators to prioritize matters that 
are most important to managing cybersecurity in their country. 
In this section, we begin to explore the inter-relationships of 
these themes—for example, how security concerns play off of 
privacy concerns and vice versa; how crafting policy mandates 
certain inevitable trade-offs; how the manner in which these trade-
offs are made by nation states results, in itself, in certain difficulties 
in enhancing international cooperation in forging consensus; and 
in the evolution of legal framework harmonization or inter-
operability.  Without casting judgment on these tradeoffs, it must at 
the same time be recognized by policy-makers, legislators, and 
regulators at the national level, and by stakeholders at the regional 
and international level, that certain balances must be obtained for 
the legal regimes to function. 
The themes are: 
1. Security-Critical Infrastructure Protection—this section will 
focus on securing the infrastructure over which data and 
communications flow. 
2. Digital Data Protection—this section focuses on certain key 
substantive issues around protection of digital data and 
database management.  This analysis is not focused exclusively 
on “privacy” issues; it also includes protection of confidential 
and proprietary data generally.  Legal frameworks that enable 
persons to control the manner in which data about them is 
handled are clearly important from many points of view, 
including protection of human rights and the availability of 
concrete mechanisms to do so, such as Opt-in/Opt-out clauses 
and so-called “Breach Notification” requirements and 
requirements for data deletion and de-identification 
(anonymization).  However, the ability of businesses and 
governments to function depends equally on the protection of 
confidential and proprietary data from inappropriate 
compromise. 
3. Cybercrimes & Enforcement—the area of cybercrimes is 
perhaps one of the more clearly identified thematic areas and 
the one where there is almost universal agreement on best 
practice, as expressed in the Budapest Convention.12 
 
 12. See Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 11, 2001, E.T.S. 
No. 185 [hereinafter Budapest Convention], available at http://conventions.coe.int
9
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4. Institutional Arrangements—finally, the article examines 
certain key institutional issues, mainly around critical 
infrastructure and data protection.  This article does not 
address institutional issues regarding cybercrimes, for 
example, because these are mainly dealt with in the context of 
the police and jurisdiction of the criminal courts. 
III. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT STATUS OF CYBERSECURITY 
THEMES 
Section III undertakes a brief substantive overview of the major 
cybersecurity themes and surveys the institutions or organizations 
mainly responsibility for the evolution of international practice in 
those areas. 
A. Security-Critical Infrastructure Protection 
This section13 deals with international legal aspects of critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP), in particular, protection of critical 
information infrastructure (CII).14  CIP is one area where 
 
/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=185&CM=1&DF=01/09/2009&CL=ENG 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 13. See generally David Satola & W.J. Luddy, Jr., The Potential for an International 
Legal Approach to Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 315 (2007), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/colloquia/EC/Satola_LuddyArticleRev.pdf 
(reviewing global efforts to achieve cybersecurity).  Certain parts of this section 
(III.A.1) are based on and drawn from Satola & Luddy. 
 14. For a working definition of these terms, see id., at 316 n.1 (“‘Critical 
Infrastructure’ and ‘Critical Infrastructure Protection’ can be broadly defined.”).  
As used in this article, “Critical Infrastructure” borrows from the definition found 
in Commission Green Paper on European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
COM (2005) 576 final (Nov. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Green Paper], and as utilized in 
the Counsel Framework Decision 69/67, 2005 J.O. (L 225) [hereinafter Council 
Decision].  Namely, infrastructure (including physical resources, services, and 
information technology) is critical if the damage, destruction, or disruption of the 
infrastructure asset would have a negative and serious impact on security.  See Green 
Paper, supra, at Annex 1.  The Green Paper defines CII as “ICT systems that are 
critical infrastructures for themselves or that are essential for the operation of 
[other] critical infrastructures. . . .”  Id.  Of particular relevance to the “cyber” 
context is the definition of an “information system” used in the Council Decision: 
an “‘information system’ means any device or group of interconnected or related 
devises, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, performs automatic 
processing of computer data, as well as computer data stored, processed, retrieved, 
or transmitted by them for the purposes of their operation, use, protection, or 
maintenance.”  See Council Decision, supra, at article 1(a).  The CRITICAL 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE HANDBOOK 26 (2006), defines “critical 
infrastructure” and “critical information infrastructure” as those assets which if 
10
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cooperation is more evident at some levels than others.  This may 
be because there are a greater variety of actors in the space (from 
the governmental, non-governmental, academic, and private 
sectors) and it is an area that is thought of being more “technical” 
than “legal.”  As noted in the literature: 
“[B]est practice” regarding CIP is evolving, with interests 
of divergent stakeholders being served in different fora.  
For example, governments are interested in national 
security, the private sector and business communities are 
interested in secure transactions, consumers and users are 
interested in protecting personal data, and technologists 
and engineers are interested in the stability of the 
network.15 
Much of CII, including the Internet, is owned and operated by 
the private sector; while other critical infrastructure is owned by 
governmental or quasi-governmental entities.  “Open” networks 
and technologies have increased the interdependence of an 
increasingly wider range of stakeholders using the Internet and 
have threatened, or at least made more vulnerable, traditional 
constructs of the Westphalian “state” in attempting to isolate and 
deal with cybersecurity issues.16 
1. International Cooperation 
The private, governmental, and non-governmental sectors, on 
the basis of both national and international efforts, have been 
taking steps to increase the security of their products, services, and 
networks.  These efforts include, for example, the work of 
international standards bodies, which range from the treaty-based 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to non-
governmental but highly influential and essential bodies such as 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).  Important issues for 
consideration include the role of standards and the role of 
government in developing standards.  Internationally, a consensus 
appears to be emerging around both the process and substantive 
 
“incapacitated or destroyed would have a debilitating impact on the national 
security and the economic and social welfare of a nation.”  The abbreviations 
“CIP” and “CIIP” are often used interchangeably because of the dependence of 
more physical critical infrastructure on secure and continuous information flows. 
 15. Satola & Luddy, supra note 13, at 317. 
 16. Id. at 318 (“This sector-specific, ‘proprietary’ approach in a world 
dominated by converged technologies is increasingly anachronistic.”). 
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elements of CIP.17  In terms of substantive elements, CIP is aimed at 
ensuring that disruptions to CII be brief, infrequent, isolated, and 
minimally detrimental.18  This was highlighted by participants in 
the Workshop.  Second, CIP should be dynamic and “process-
oriented.”19  Although the rate of adoption has not been as rapid as 
one might ideally want,  successful efforts by the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to 
promote development and adoption of security extensions for the 
domain name system (DNSSEC) illustrate how a private-sector led 
initiative (with government participation) can significantly enhance 
cybersecurity.20 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) are generally 
cooperative endeavors among governments, academic institutions, 
and commercial entities consisting mainly of technologists aimed at 
identifying cyber-vulnerabilities and defending against cyber-
attacks.21  Among other functions, they are intended to promote 
information sharing and better coordination among government 
 
 17. Id. at 318–19; see also ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD 
GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS: TOWARDS A 
CULTURE OF SECURITY (2002), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/22/15582260.pdf; 
Creation of a Global Culture of Cyber Security, G.A. Res. 57/239, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/57/239 (Jan. 31, 2003), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org
/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/555/22/PDF/N0255522.pdf?OpenElement; Combating 
the Criminal Misuse of Information Technologies, G.A. Res. 56/121, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/56/121 (Jan. 23, 2002), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime
/a_res_56/121e.pdf; Combating the Criminal Misuse of Information 
Technologies, G.A. Res. 55/63, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/63 (Jan. 22, 2001), available 
at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5563e.pdf. 
 18. See Green Paper, supra note 14, at 1. 
 19. See generally Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Where We’re Headed: New Developments 
and Trends in the Law of Information Security, 3 PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY L. J. 103 
(2007) (discussing what is entailed in process-oriented approaches). 
 20. See generally DNSSEC: DNS SECURITY EXTENSIONS, http://www.dnssec.net 
(last updated Feb. 10, 2011) (providing information regarding the DNSSEC and 
its ties with ICANN); see also Press Release, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & 
Numbers, Global Upgrade Makes Internet More Secure (July 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.prweb.com/releases/DNSSEC/Cyber_Crime/prweb4321774.htm 
(providing more information about DNSSEC); see also generally EUROPEAN NETWORK 
& INFO. SEC. AGENCY, GOOD PRACTICES GUIDE FOR DEPLOYING DNSSEC (2010), 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/res/technologies/tech/gpgdnssec (describing 
role of DNSSEC and how to deploy DNSSEC). 
 21. Satola & Luddy, supra note 13, at 319.  CERTs may also be referred to as 
Computer Security Incident Response Teams.  Cf. Incident Response Teams Around 
the World, CERT, http://www.cert.org/csirts/csirt-map.html (last updated Mar. 5, 
2008) (showing some of the CERT/CSIRT organizations throughout the world 
and noting how cooperation speeds response to attacks). 
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agencies and the private sector.22  The Forum of Incident Response 
and Security Teams (FIRST) is an international non-governmental 
organization that seeks to promote global cooperation and 
coordination among these teams.23  Its membership includes over 
200 teams across 48 countries.24  FIRST is an international 
organization bringing together a number of national CERTs.25  It 
provides a forum for information sharing among CERTs and other 
incident response organizations and is also a repository of technical 
and other information about CIP.26  As such, FIRST is an example 
of enhanced international cooperation in the area of cybersecurity. 
The European Government CERTs (EGC) group has twelve 
member organizations.27  The primary objective of EGC is to 
develop efficient and effective cooperation between the teams with 
a focus on incident and vulnerability management.28  Primarily, 
EGC is an operational group with a technical focus; national policy 
is determined by other agencies within individual countries.29 
CERTs typically focus on technical issues and their main 
function is information sharing providing primarily early warning 
functions.30  In parallel, as the legal framework around CIP evolves, 
continued improvements in cooperation and consultation will be 
necessary in order to guard against differences in laws or the legal 
frameworks of countries resulting in divergences that would hinder 
rather than aid effective CIP.  Different interest groups 
(stakeholders) need to talk to each other to ensure real and 
effective cybersecurity and to avoid a divergence in approach to 
CIP.31  “As is already recognized by the literature, coordination, 
collaboration, and consultation are key.”32 
 
 
 22. Satola & Luddy, supra note 13, at 328. 
 23. See FIRST, http://www.first.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 24. FIRST Members, FIRST, http://www.first.org/members/map/ (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2011). 
 25. See FIRST, supra note 23. 
 26. Id. 
 27. EGC GROUP, http://www.egc-group.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) 
(describing EGC group and enumerating its member organizations). 
 28. Facts (Part one), EGC GROUP, http://www.egc-group.org/facts1.html (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Satola & Luddy, supra note 13, at 320. 
 31. This phenomenon was noted with respect to cybercrime legislation by the 
European Union.  See Council Decision, supra note 14, at L 69/68, ¶ 17. 
 32. Satola & Luddy, supra note 13, at 319. 
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As was pointed out in the Workshop, many countries have 
elements of the legal enabling environment addressing 
cybersecurity, but these national legal frameworks vary widely in 
terms of the manner in which cybersecurity issues are addressed.  
Moreover, even where countries do have specific provisions dealing 
with CIIP, differences exist between countries as to how CII is to be 
protected.  The modules identified in Section II (CIP, digital data 
protection, cybercrimes, and institutional aspects) remain the focal 
points of evolving best practice.33 
2. U.S. Private, Governmental, and Non-Governmental Cooperation 
Perhaps the central lesson regarding CIP that emerged 
experimentally is that the effectiveness of any CIP program is 
directly proportional to the extent of cooperation among key 
private, governmental, and non-governmental actors.  However, no 
general standards for such cooperation have emerged.  Perhaps the 
most comprehensive and detailed instance of this form of 
cooperation is provided by the U.S.  Comprehensive National 
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI).34 
The CNCI began in 2008 under the Bush Administration when 
the President issued National Security Presidential Directive 54 
(also known as “Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23”) on 
January 8, 2008.35  The directive called for the formation of the 
CNCI.  The Bush administration developed CNCI to improve how 
the federal government protects sensitive information from hackers 
and nation states trying to break into agency networks and critical 
national infrastructure.  Development of the CNCI continued 
under the Obama administration and on March 2, 2010, the White 
House published an unclassified summary of its CNCI, indicating 
 
 33. Id. at 321. 
 34. It should also be noted that 2010 saw a number of bills being introduced 
in the 111th U.S. Congress dealing with institutional issues, coordination of 
cybersecurity and protection of CII at the federal government level, as well as 
development of human capacity in the area of cybersecurity.  See, e.g., Protecting 
Cyberspace as a National Asset Act, S. 3480, 111th Cong. (2010), and Homeland 
Security Cyber and Physical Infrastructure Protection Act, H.R. 5548, 111th Cong. 
(2010).  It could therefore be expected that the 112th Congress may take some 
legislative action in these areas. 
 35. The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 23 (Jan. 8, 2008).  The full text of this Presidential 
Directive was never released to the public. 
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that it consisted of twelve “initiatives.”36  These included Initiative 
#2 to deploy an intrusion detection system of sensors across the 
Federal enterprise and Initiative #3 to pursue deployment of 
intrusion prevention systems across the Federal enterprise.37 
To implement Initiatives #2 and #3, the U.S. federal 
government developed and deployed the Einstein Program 
(Einstein).38  In general, Einstein is an intrusion detection system 
that monitors the Internet network gateways of government 
departments and agencies in the U.S. for unauthorized traffic and 
malicious content.39  The original deployment was Einstein 1.  The 
current deployment is Einstein 2, which conducts automatic full 
packet inspection of traffic entering or exiting U.S. government 
networks using signature-based intrusion detection technology.40  
Einstein 2 is capable of alerting US-CERT in real time to the 
presence of malicious or potentially harmful activity.41 
Einstein 3 is currently being deployed on a limited pilot 
program basis and adds the additional capability to do real-time, 
full, deep-packet inspection and to respond appropriately to cyber-
threats before harm is done, providing an intrusion prevention 
system supporting dynamic defense.42  In addition, when deemed 
necessary by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Einstein 3 can send alerts that do not contain the content of 
communications to the National Security Agency (NSA) so that 
DHS efforts may be supported by NSA.43  Einstein 2 is based on 
predefined attack signatures that come from internal, commercial, 
and public sources.44  Under Einstein 3, DHS will be able to adapt 
threat signatures determined by NSA in the course of its foreign 
intelligence and Department of Defense information assurance 
 
 36. See The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/cybersecurity.pdf (last visited Feb. 
13, 2011) [hereinafter Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative]. 
 37. Id. at 2–3. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR EINSTEIN 
2, at 2–3 (May 19, 2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia
_einstein2.pdf. 
 40. Id. at 3–4. 
 41. Id. at 2. 
 42. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
INITIATIVE THREE EXERCISE, at 3 (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary
/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_nppd_initiative3.pdf. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 7. 
15
Satola and Judy: Towards a Dynamic Approach to Enhancing International Cooperation
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
Satola.docx  
1760 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:4 
missions.45  Intrusion detection systems require signatures of 
malicious traffic, allowing the system to search traffic flows for 
those malicious configurations.  One advantage of Einstein 3 is that 
it connects to intelligence sources to provide a more complete list 
of signatures.46 
Einstein 3 may also be deployed to monitor government 
computer traffic on private sector sites.  Defense Department 
officials have suggested that Einstein 3 be used to provide CIP in 
the private sector, particularly with respect to CII, such as CII 
serving the financial, utility, and communication industries.47 
The Einstein Program, and most particularly Einstein 3, has 
raised concerns among a number of privacy and civil liberties 
groups, particularly with the added capacity for deep-packet 
inspection, data sharing with NSA, and extension of the program to 
the private sector.48 
In addition, concerns have been raised regarding a program 
called “Perfect Citizen” that is being implemented by Raytheon49 
under a $100 million classified contract with NSA.  “Perfect 
Citizen” helps assess the vulnerabilities and capabilities of networks 
of domestic U.S. “critical infrastructure” such as utilities and 
nuclear power plants, both private and government run.50  This is a 
response to increasing concern by intelligence officials about 
foreign surveillance of computer systems that control the electric 
grid and other U.S. infrastructure.51  Google is partnering with NSA 
 
 45. Id. at 3. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Kim Zetter, Pentagon: Let Us Secure Your Network or Face the ‘Wild Wild West’ 
Internet Alone, WIRED (May 27, 2010, 1:50 PM), http://www.wired.com
/threatlevel/2010/05/einstein-on-private-networks; Kim Zetter, U.S. Declassifies Part 
of Secret Cybersecurity Plan, WIRED (Mar. 2, 2010, 4:19 PM), http://www.wired.com
/threatlevel/2010/03/us-declassifies-part-of-secret-cybersecurity-plan. 
 48. See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., EINSTEIN INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM: 
QUESTIONS THAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED 1 (July 2009), http://www.cdt.org
/security/20090728_einstein_rpt.pdf; see also generally PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
FOR EINSTEIN 2, supra note 39 (explaining the privacy impact of Einstein 2); 
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE INITIATIVE THREE EXERCISE, supra note 42 
(explaining the privacy impact of the Initiative Three Exercise). 
 49.  See OUR COMPANY, RAYTHEON, http://www.raytheon.com/ourcompany 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (“[A] technology and innovation leader specializing in 
defense, homeland security and other government markets throughout the 
world.”). 
 50. See Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Plans Cyber Shield for Utilities, Companies, WALL 
ST. J., July 8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052748704545004575352983850463108.html. 
 51. Id. 
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to help Google analyze the major corporate espionage attack that 
recently targeted its computer networks.52 
The essential issue presented here is what the boundaries to 
cooperation are or what the boundaries to the forms of cooperation 
are.  There is an obvious and difficult tension between the state’s 
responsibility for public safety and the citizen’s “right to be left 
alone” by the state.  While these issues have been widely discussed 
and congressional hearings have been held, no consensus or 
resolution has emerged.  The tension is an ancient one, but the 
resolution of the tension is far more difficult and consequential in 
the age of global cybersecurity.  How these issues are being 
handled in the U.S. is but one example, albeit an illustrative one, of 
how the contours of the debate are taking shape.  As suggested 
throughout this article, these issues continue to evolve rapidly and 
often unpredictably. 
B. Digital Data Protection—Striking a Balance 
A key area dealt with in cybersecurity legislation is the 
protection of digital data.  This area may be thought of in terms of 
confidentiality of digital data generally and in terms of personal 
data more specifically.  The more general term would include 
protection of trade secrets and other forms of intellectual property, 
protection of confidential client information, and protection of the 
sensitive or proprietary information of businesses and 
governments.  The latter refers to information about particular 
human beings that may be identified or may be identifiable 
according to the standards of different jurisdictions.  The latter is 
referred to by various terms, such as privacy, protection of private 
life, protection of personal information, and data protection.  It 
also presents complex technical issues, such as the issue of 
attribution, the extent of the ability to determine the true senders 
of any message or request for information, and permissible means 
of indirect identification.53  It appears that greater cross-border 
cooperation in the area of digital data protection could be 
 
 52. See Ellen Nakashima, Google to Enlist NSA to Help It Ward Off Cyberattacks, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2010/02/03/AR2010020304057.html. 
 53. This article focuses only on data in digital or electronic form.  
Nevertheless it is recognized that confidential and personal data is regularly held 
in hard copy form and that many of the considerations and legislative acts 
discussed apply equally to hard copy. 
17
Satola and Judy: Towards a Dynamic Approach to Enhancing International Cooperation
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
Satola.docx  
1762 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:4 
achieved.  Though hard evidence is not available, the reasons 
hampering greater cooperation seem to revolve around issues of 
the balance and the trade-offs between data protection and 
security—issues that go to the core of the relationship between the 
individual and the state.  This may make international cooperation 
more difficult. 
1. Data Confidentiality 
The protection of confidential digital data is critical to the 
functioning of global commerce and government on every level.  It 
has been estimated that more than half of the value of U.S. 
businesses lies in their trade secrets and other intellectual property 
and that the value of such trade secrets and intellectual property 
lost each year is in the billions of dollars.54  Private firms and other 
companies with fiduciary and near fiduciary obligations (law and 
accounting firms, for example) must be able to communicate 
confidentially.  Even governments may have a need for confidential 
communications.  The Wikileaks cases of 201055 have, ironically, 
laid bare both the sensitivities and the corresponding necessities 
regarding protecting data confidentiality in the Internet age. 
It is a basic principle of knowledge management that 
appropriate sharing of information enables organizations to make 
smarter decisions and produce more successful results.  
Inappropriate sharing and inappropriate restrictions on sharing 
produces an increased risk to them of adverse consequences, 
including less intelligent decisions.  While the various Wikileaks 
cases may have been aimed at uprooting the “conspiratorial 
nature” of governments,56 they clearly demonstrate that 
organizations are information-gathering and information-
processing machines and information is a tool that can be used to 
attack or to benefit.  It remains to be seen what the effects of this 
type of use information will have on organizations in terms of their 
information gathering, dissemination, and, especially, information 
security processes and procedures.  These incidents also highlight 
the difficult balancing issues of what sharing, restriction, and, 
 
 54. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR & CORPORATE CRIME 273 (Lawrence M. 
Salinger ed., 2005). 
 55. See Wikileaks, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 56. See Julian Assange, State and Terrorist Conspiracies, IQ (Nov. 10, 2006), 
http://iq.org/conspiracies.pdf. 
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therefore, security practices are appropriate for different types of 
organizations, different types of information, and, in different 
contexts, time.  Thus, we see real examples of the benefits of 
looking at these cybersecurity questions in a more disaggregated 
and modular way. 
2. Protection of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) 
Treatment of PII is an essential part of creating a cybersecurity 
legal and regulatory enabling environment.  The scope of the 
concerns that are inherently involved in the topic of PII protection 
is enormous—freedom of speech, freedom of expression, access to 
information, political speech, censorship, personal data collected 
for police or other surveillance purposes, Internet filtering, 
censorship, political speech online, and the treatment by third 
parties (data processors) of the collection, processing, and 
dissemination of data in digital format of an individual (data 
subject).  Data subjects are real people and not juridical persons or 
other “constitutional” beings of privacy. 
The trend globally in legal frameworks regarding PII 
protection has been towards the adoption of a “rights-based” or 
“constitutional” approach: balancing the “privacy” interests of the 
individual against security and other policy interests of the state, or 
against other interests, such as commercial confidentiality, that the 
state wishes to foster or avoid restricting.  This constitutional 
approach is inherent in the European Directives and the Council 
of Europe (CoE) Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Privacy 
Convention) (both discussed in more detail below)57  Even India—
which currently has only very limited legislation specifically dealing 
with PII protection—uses a constitutional approach to protecting 
privacy.58  Much of available good international practices in terms 
 
 57. Council Directive 95/46,  Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 
281) 31 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=CONSLEG:1995L0046:20031120:EN:PDF; Council of Europe, Convention for 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108 [hereinafter Convention with Regard to 
Automatic Processing], available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties
/html/108.htm. 
 58. For a comprehensive discussion of the current state of Indian privacy 
protection, see SHRI RAHUL MATTHAN, APPROACH PAPER FOR A LEGISLATION ON 
PRIVACY (2010), available at http://persmin.gov.in/WriteReadData/RTI
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of the treatment in legal frameworks of digital data are based in the 
constitutional approach to privacy. 
There is a great deal in the media currently regarding privacy 
in the digital age.  Indeed one outgrowth of the U.N.’s Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF) was the creation of a so-called Privacy 
Dynamic Coalition.  Just prior to the IGF meeting in Sharm el 
Sheik in November 2009, the Coalition, along with civil society 
groups and other privacy experts, promulgated the so-called 
“Madrid Privacy Declaration,”59 affirming privacy as a fundamental 
human right.  While the Declaration takes a fairly wide sweep on 
privacy issues in the digital age, it also urges countries that have not 
yet established a comprehensive framework for privacy protection 
and an independent data protection authority to do so as 
expeditiously as possible.  It also urges countries that have not 
already done so to adopt the CoE Privacy Convention.  The Privacy 
Convention was opened for signature in 1981 and the CoE is 
currently involved in a consultation for the modernization of the 
Privacy Convention. 
Among the key digital data issues dealt with from a 
cybersecurity point of view in this report are (1) protections against 
secondary use and (2) notification in the case of a breach of digital 
“privacy.”  A third area of digital data protection explored in the 
report, as will be seen from the country benchmarking section, is 
the variety of institutional forms that have been put in place in 
response to these digital data concerns. 
Many countries have established data or privacy 
commissioners.  International practice in this area, as with many 
others explored in this report, shows that there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach. 
In this regard, for example, there is a major schism between 
the United States on the one hand and Europe (and other 
countries) on the other in terms of the structure of privacy and the 
regulation of how data is gathered and used.  To generalize 
considerably, in the United States, privacy law is applied 
differentially depending on the economic or business sector and 
on the type of personal data.  For example, different laws are 
applied to personal data held by financial institutions, educational 
 
/aproach_paper.pdf. 
 59. Madrid Privacy Declaration, THE PUBLIC VOICE (Nov. 3, 2009), 
http://thepublicvoice.org/madrid-declaration. 
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institutions and health care providers and to drivers license data, 
video rental data, etc.  In Europe, personal data is regulated in 
general terms regardless of these distinctions pursuant to European 
Union (E.U.)-wide Directives.60  U.S. law in general tends to be 
more permissive about the level and timing of the consent of the 
data subject that needs to be given about the personal data that 
may be collected and shared.  The law in Europe and in countries 
following the European model tends to be less permissive in that 
regard.  To bridge this gap, the U.S. Department of Commerce and 
the European Commission have developed a “safe harbor” 
framework of data protection principles.61  This safe harbor is 
designed to provide U.S. organizations with a means to satisfy the 
European Union’s legal requirement that “adequate” data 
protections be afforded to personally identifiable information 
transferred from the European Union to the United States, since 
U.S. law is not considered to be adequate in that regard. 
Regardless of the differences in systems and approaches, 
certain principles can be distilled from the variegated practices.  In 
terms of managing one’s own data, a data subject should be 
enabled through the legal framework to be able to verify the data 
about himself or herself and make such corrections as are necessary 
in a timely and transparent fashion.  In the words of one scholar, a 
data subject should not be “excluded” from his or her own data.62 
Data breach notification is another area of concern to data 
subjects, policymakers, and regulators around the world, and—
again—practice is varied.  Even in the E.U. (under the umbrella of 
a common framework Directive) there are a variety of approaches 
to data breach notification.  First, there must be a determination of 
the nature of the data that is subject to protection.  This depends 
on how “personal data” is defined in the law.  Then a 
 
 60. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 57 (discussing the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data); Council Directive 02/58, Processing of Personal Data 
and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. 
(L 201) 37–47 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ
/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:201:0037:0047:EN:PDF (concerning the processing 
of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications 
sector). 
 61. See generally Safe Harbor, EXPORT.GOV, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor 
(last updated Mar. 31, 2011) (providing the background and links to the Safe 
Harbor frameworks). 
 62. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 134–35 (2008). 
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determination needs to be made as to what information about the 
person is covered and what exceptions, if any, exist.  For example, 
“public” information would probably not be covered, but that 
depends on how “public” is defined.  Next is a determination of 
what constitutes a “trigger” for a breach notification—how is it 
determined when data about a person has been acquired by a third 
party in an unauthorized fashion under the law, and are there any 
exceptions, such as for encrypted or redacted data?  If a notice 
obligation applies, to whom does the notice of breach go—to the 
data subject, to the data intermediary, to the public authorities, or 
some combination?  At what time must the notice be given, in what 
form, and how much detail about the breach must be included in 
the notice?  Finally, what are the remedies to be provided and how 
and by whom are they enforced? 
A number of info-security standards are being developed that 
may apply here as well.  These include the practices of the bank 
and credit card industries and even the International Standards 
Organization (ISO), ISO 17799, for example.63 
3. Developments in the E.U. and the U.S. 
In the E.U., the principal framework for the protection of PII 
is the E.U.’s Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (E.U. Directive).64  
The E.U. Directive regulates secondary use of data, requiring that 
data must be “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with 
those purposes.”65  One of the main purposes of the E.U. Directive 
was to achieve harmonization across the E.U.  Article 29, setting up 
a “Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data,” that provides advice concerning 
the meaning and application of the E.U. Directive including 
whether Member States are compliant with the Directive. 
The European Commission conducted a public consultation in 
2009 on “the current legal framework” for the fundamental right to 
protection of personal data.66  The subsequent report stated: “The 
 
 63. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org
/iso/home.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
 64. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 57. 
 65. Id. art. 6, § 1(b). 
 66. FRANCIS ALDHOUSE, INFO. POL’Y & RTS., EUROPEAN COMMISSION REVIEW OF 
DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC: PRIORITY POINTS FOR CHANGE, § 1.1, n.1 (2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0003/contributions/citizens
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/10
  
2011] CYBERSECURITY LEGAL ISSUES 1767 
Directive was developed at a time before the full commercialisation 
[sic] of the internet and when many of the technologies underlying 
much modern data processing were still experimental.”67  The 
report went further and concluded that these changes did not 
result in any need to address the underlying fundamental 
principles of data protection, including the principles found in the 
OECD Guidelines of 1980,68 but recognized that certain elements 
of the E.U. Directive could be updated to simplify processes and 
adjust “the legal framework to take account of changes in the 
handling of personal information brought about by fifteen years of 
technological change.”69 
As a result of this consultation, the E.U. Commission issued a 
Communication to the E.U. Parliament and the Council on 
November 4, 2010 subtitled “A comprehensive approach on 
personal data protection in the European Union” (E.U. 
Communication).70  The E.U. Communication proposed a wide-
ranging and fundamental update of E.U. data protection law.  Less 
than a month later, on December 1, 2010, the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) released a preliminary staff report entitled 
“Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change” (FTC 
Proposal).71  The FTC Proposal sets forth a broad new framework, 
which like the E.U. Communication, suggests wide-ranging and 
fundamental revisions to U.S. privacy law.  A major Internet privacy 
report was issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Internet 
Policy Task Force on December 16, 2010.  The report is entitled 
“Commercial Data Privacy and Innovation in the Internet 
Economy: A Dynamic Policy Framework.”  This report, along with 
the FTC Proposal, will inform policy decisions by a recently created 
White House Privacy and Internet Policy Subcommittee.  This 
Subcommittee is expected to address and coordinate the direction 
 
/aldhouse_francis_en.pdf. 
 67. Id. § 2.1. 
 68. See infra Part III.B.6. 
 69.  FRANCIS ALDHOUSE, supra note 66, at § 4.3. 
 70. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Comprehensive 
Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, at 2, COM (2010) 609 
final (Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter E.U. Communication], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/com_2010_609_en.pdf. 
 71. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2010) 
[hereinafter FTC PROPOSAL], available at http://ftc.gov/os/2010/12
/101201privacyreport.pdf. 
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of U.S. federal law on privacy regulation from the standpoint of the 
Executive Branch.72 
Although there are a number of differences between the FTC 
Proposal, the Department of Commerce report, and the E.U. 
Communication, their commonalities are notable, including an 
emphasis on prior consent, stronger remedies for violations of 
privacy, and the role of changes in technology in driving the need 
for changes in privacy law.  Both focused strongly on the role of 
“profiling,” that is, the use of technologies for data gathering and 
analysis and related business and governmental practices that 
enable the creation of “profiles” that have the same effects, for all 
practical purposes, as gathering obviously personal information.73  
The E.U. Communication also focused on the effects of cloud 
computing on privacy law.74  On December 15, 2010, the European 
Parliament approved a strong and comprehensive resolution asking 
the E.U. Commission to carry out an in-depth study of “new 
advertising practices,” including behavioral advertising.75 
A principal factor in driving this tendency toward increasing 
convergence in the U.S. and E.U. legal regimes for data protection 
is the high level of integration of the U.S. and E.U. economies, as 
reflected in the number of corporate offices in each other’s 
jurisdictions and the significant personal data flows between the 
two economies. 
This convergence is further advanced by the adoption on July 
6, 2010 of Mexico’s “Law on the Protection of Personal Data Held 
by Private Parties.”76  In many ways, this law is more robust than 
 
 72. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTERNET POL’Y TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA 
PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK, 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/iptf_privacy_greenpaper
_12162010.pdf; “Do-Not-Track” Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, 
Trade and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 9 
(2010) (statement of Daniel J. Weitzner, Associate Administrator for Policy 
Analysis and Development, National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce). 
 73. E.U. Communication, supra note 70, at § 2.2.4; FTC PROPOSAL, supra note 
71, at 37. 
 74. E.U. Communication, supra note 70, at § 2.2.3. 
 75. Resolution on the Impact of Advertising on Consumer Behaviour, EUR. PARL. 
DOC. T7-0484/2010 (Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu
/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-0484&language=EN. 
 76. The official Spanish language version of the law is available at 
http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5150631&fecha=05/07/2010; 
an unofficial English language translation is available courtesy of the International 
Association of Privacy Professionals at https://www.privacyassociation.org/images
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approaches taken to data protection in the United States, and, 
depending on forthcoming implementing regulations, it may bring 
Mexican privacy law far closer to, or go beyond, the approaches of 
the E.U. Directive. 
4. CoE Privacy Convention 
The CoE Privacy Convention is the only international treaty 
dealing specifically with data protection.  It is mainly a European 
instrument, although it is open to signature by countries outside of 
Europe.  One key feature of the convention is that it is not self-
executing, so its adherents would need to incorporate its principles 
into national legislation.  For example, similarly to the E.U. 
Directive, the CoE Privacy Convention requires that data be “stored 
for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way 
incompatible with those purposes.”77  On the specific subject of 
profiling, the CoE Committee of Ministers recommended to all 
member states that profiling be permitted, subject to certain 
exceptions, only if “the data subject or her or his legal 
representative has given her or his free, specific and informed 
consent.”78 
5. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a forum that was 
established in 1989 for twenty-one Pacific Rim countries and that 
seeks to promote free trade and economic cooperation throughout 
the Asia-Pacific region.79  They are referred to as “Member 
Economies.”  The population of APEC’s Member Economies 
exceeds 2.7 billion people, and the Member Economies represent 
approximately fifty-four percent of world real GDP and forty-four 
percent of world trade.80  APEC’s activities are focused on three key 
 
/uploads/Mexico%20Federal%20Data%20Protection%20Act%20(July%202010).pdf. 
 77. See Convention with Regard to Automatic Processing, supra note 57, art. 
5b. 
 78. Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation of the Comm. of Ministers to Member 
States on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
in the Context of Profiling, 1099th Meeting, Doc. No. CM/Rec (2010)13, § 3.4(b) 
(2010), available at https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1710949&Site=CM. 
 79. See ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, http://www.apec.org (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2011). 
 80. See ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, APEC AT A GLANCE: ADVANCING FREE 
TRADE FOR ASIA-PACIFIC PROSPERITY 2 (2010), available at http://publications.apec.org
/publication-detail.php?pub_id=1077 (click “Download Document” on the right 
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areas: trade and investment liberalization, business facilitation, and 
economic and technical cooperation.  In support of these goals, 
APEC has established the APEC Privacy Framework (Framework).81  
Although the Framework speaks to privacy regulation within 
Member Economies, its focus is on information sharing between 
economies, cooperatively developing a system of cross-border 
privacy rules for use by businesses, and developing arrangements 
for cross-border cooperation in investigation and enforcement.  
The Framework addresses privacy as a consumer protection and 
trust issue rather than from the standpoint of human rights and 
civil liberties and it places heavy reliance on self-regulation. 
Recently APEC established a Cross-Border Privacy 
Enforcement Arrangement (CPEA) that facilitates information 
sharing and cooperation among authorities responsible for data 
and consumer protection in the APEC region.82 The CPEA was 
endorsed by APEC Ministers in November 2009 and commenced 
operation on July 16, 2010.  The initial signatories, that is, 
participating privacy enforcement authorities, were the Privacy 
Commissioners from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Hong Kong, 
and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.83 
Many privacy advocates do not regard the Framework, the 
CPEA and APEC’s other privacy oriented projects as providing an 
appropriate level of protection, especially with respect to the most 
recent technological challenges.  However, it is also generally 
recognized that APEC’s initiatives represent significant forward 
steps in privacy protection, particularly in a number of the less 
developed countries in the region, and may constitute valuable 
building blocks for further evolution of this legal framework. 
 
side of the webpage). 
 81. ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, PRIVACY FRAMEWORK (2005), available at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(03995EABC73F94816C2AF4
AA2645824B)~APEC+Privacy+Framework.pdf/$file/APEC+Privacy+Framework.pdf. 
 82. ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, APEC COOPERATION ARRANGEMENT FOR 
CROSS-BORDER PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT 1–2 (2010), available at http://aimp.apec.org
/Documents/2010/ECSG/DPS1/10_ecsg_dps1_013.pdf; see also ASIA-PACIFIC 
ECON. COOPERATION, APEC FACT SHEET—APEC CROSS-BORDER PRIVACY 
ENFORCEMENT ARRANGEMENT (2010), available at http://www.apec.org/About-Us
/About-APEC/Fact-Sheets/Collection/~/media/Files/AboutUs/Factsheet/FS
_CPEA_020710.ashx (providing more information on the Cross-Border Privacy 
Enforcement Arrangement). 
 83. See FTC Joins New Asia-Pacific Multinational Network of Privacy Enforcement 
Authorities, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 19, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/07
/apec.shtm. 
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6. Other International Sources 
Another source of data protection principles is the OECD 
Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Data Flows of Personal Data (Guidelines).84  The Guidelines are 
built around eight principles for treatment of personal data: 
collection (limiting the means by which data are collected), data 
quality (dealing with the relevance of the data collected), “purpose 
specification” (requiring that the purposes for which data are 
collected are known in advance and subsequent use is limited to 
those purposes), use limitation (limiting disclosure of data), 
safeguards (protecting data against risk of loss or unauthorized 
access), openness (relating to the operational standards of the data 
controller), individual participation (setting forth the rights of the 
“data subject” over his or her own data), and accountability 
(imposed on data controllers).85  The Guidelines form the basis of 
the legislative framework in Canada, for example. 
Finally, it is important to note that at the two most recent 
meetings of the International Conference of Data Protection and 
Privacy Commissioners, the Conference has adopted resolutions 
with respect to the adoption of binding global privacy standards 
and facilitating cross-border enforcement actions.  Perhaps the 
most comprehensive and substantive of these resolutions is the so-
called “Madrid Resolution,” adopted in November 2009.86 
C. Cybercrime—The Law Enforcement Response 
International best practice, if not international cooperation 
and collaboration, is more evident in the area of cybercrime, 
perhaps due in part to the near universality of the substantive 
provisions of the Budapest Convention (defined below). 
 
 84. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON 
THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 85. See id. at pt. 2. 
 86. See INT’L CONFERENCE ON DATA PROT. AND PRIVACY COMM’RS, INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA AND PRIVACY: THE MADRID 
RESOLUTION (2009), available at http://www.privacyconference2009.org/dpas_space
/space_reserved/documentos_adoptados/common/2009_Madrid/estandares
_resolucion_madrid_en.pdf. 
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1. International Experience 
At the recent twelfth pentennial U.N. Crime Congress, held in 
April 2010 in Salvador, Brazil, efforts to negotiate a global 
cybercrime treaty were unsuccessful despite intense discussion 
among the parties.87  A number of major powers disagreed over 
national sovereignty issues and concerns for human rights.  For 
example, the Budapest Convention permits police under certain 
circumstances to cross national boundaries to access servers 
without consent from local authorities.  Russia, for example, 
asserted that permitting foreign law enforcement agencies to 
conduct Internet searches inside Russian borders violated the 
Russian Constitution.  In addition, because of phenomena such as 
cloud computing, which can result in data being transferred across 
national boundaries to servers in any location, police from one 
country can be denied access to data in a foreign location.  Other 
countries insisted on the need for privacy provisions that would 
protect users’ data from police investigation when it is stored in 
another country via a cloud computing partner. 
These and other issues present countries with inherently 
conflicting policy objectives and cultural clashes, including the 
need to balance different interests and rights such as security and 
privacy, and are compounded by the impact of rapidly developing 
technologies on the structure of any agreement.  The resolution of 
issues on this level suggests the need for the kind of bottom-up 
approach suggested by this article. 
a. Council of Europe 
In the area of cybercrime, the 2001 Convention of the Council 
of Europe (“CoE Convention” or the “Budapest Convention”)88 is a 
historic milestone vis-à-vis cybersecurity and cybercrime and 
provides a nearly universal standard of good international practice 
regarding legal frameworks for the protection against 
“cybercrimes.”  Although the Convention was promulgated under 
the auspices of the Council of Europe, it is open to signature by any 
country.  In fact, a number of non-CoE countries (for example, the 
United States) have not only signed but also ratified the 
 
 87. See The Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org
/unodc/en/crime-congress/12th-crime-congress.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 88. Budapest Convention, supra note 12. 
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Convention. 
The Convention addresses three sets of issues: the categories 
of cybercrime that nations should address in their criminal codes, 
the authorities governments should adopt in order to access 
communications or stored records for evidentiary purposes, and 
mechanisms for transnational cooperation.  So far, the Budapest 
Convention has entered into force in thirty countries, and another 
twenty-one countries have signed it or been invited to accede.  
Moreover, according to the CoE, some one hundred countries have 
made use of the Budapest Convention when developing national 
cybercrime legislation. 
Cybercrime raises many traditional law enforcement issues.  A 
recent dispute between the U.S. and the U.K., for example, 
illustrates how traditional tensions over extradition also arise in the 
cybercrime context.89  While local limitations of resources and 
expertise present hurdles to effective law enforcement, one of the 
transnational barriers of a legal nature that should be considered is 
the existence of nation states that serve as “safe havens” and what 
dynamics and incentives are involved for a nation state to maintain 
“safe haven status.” 
The Convention consists of four chapters90: 
• Chapter I, titled Use of terms, includes definitions of “computer 
system,” “computer data,” “service provider,” and “traffic data.” 
• Chapter II, titled Measures to be taken at the national level, consists 
of three sections: Substantive criminal law (Section 1), Procedural 
law (Section 2), and Jurisdiction (Section 3).  All sections in the 
Convention are further subdivided into “Titles.”  The section 
on substantive criminal law is divided into five titles with the 
first four titles classifying different types of offenses: 
 Offences [sic] against the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of computer data and systems, which include 
offenses such as illegal access, illegal interception, data 
interference, system interference, and misuse of 
devices. 
 Computer related offences [sic], which include forgery and 
fraud. 
 
 
 89. See Jo Adetunji & Matthew Weaver, Gary McKinnon May Avoid US Extradition, 
David Cameron Suggests, THE GUARDIAN, July 21, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk
/world/2010/jul/21/gary-mckinnon-extradition-david-cameron. 
 90. Budapest Convention, supra note 12, passim. 
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 Content-related offences [sic], which include offences 
related to child pornography. 
 Offences [sic] related to infringements of copyright and related 
rights. 
• The section on procedural law includes Common provisions 
(Title 1) that apply to the Convention’s articles on substantive 
criminal law, “other criminal offences [sic] committed by 
means of a computer system,” and to “the collection of 
evidence in electronic form” relating to criminal offences 
[sic].  There is also a title on Expedited preservation of stored 
computer data and includes provisions dealing with Production 
order, Search and seizure of stored computer data, Real-time collection 
of traffic data, and Interception of content data. 
• Chapter III on International co-operation includes general 
principles relating to “international cooperation,” 
“extradition,” “mutual assistance,” and “spontaneous 
information.”  The chapter also contains procedures 
pertaining to Requests for mutual assistance in the absence of 
applicable international agreements and to Confidentiality and 
limitation on use including Specific Provisions (Section 2) on 
Mutual assistance regarding provisional measures (Title 1), Mutual 
assistance regarding investigative powers (Title 2), and on a 24/7 
Network. 
• Chapter IV titled Final provisions contains standard provisions 
found commonly in Council of Europe treaties.  Importantly, 
in accordance with Article 40, any state may “declare that it 
avails itself of the possibility of requiring additional elements” 
as provided for under certain articles. 
In accordance with Article 42, any state may “declare that it 
avails itself of the reservation(s) provided for” in certain articles.  
By ratifying or acceding to the Convention, countries agree to 
ensure that their domestic laws criminalize the conduct described 
in the section on substantive criminal law and establish the 
procedural tools necessary to investigate and prosecute such 
crimes. 
The Convention uses technology-neutral language, so that it 
applies to and covers both current and future technologies.  States 
may exclude petty or insignificant misconduct from the offenses it 
defines.  Offenses must be committed intentionally for criminal 
liability to arise.  Additional specific intentional elements only 
apply to certain offenses—for instance, to computer-related fraud, 
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with the requirement of fraudulent or dishonest intent of 
procuring economic benefit. 
International coordination and cooperation are necessary for 
the prosecution of cybercrime and other information security and 
network security issues and governments must take innovative steps 
to curb these serious threats.  Offenses must be committed “without 
right,” referring to conduct undertaken without authority or 
conduct not covered by established legal defenses, excuses, 
justifications, or relevant principles under domestic law.  These 
definitions are not intended to criminalize legitimate and common 
activities inherent in the design of systems and networks or 
legitimate operating or commercial practices. 
b. International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
There are many resources interpreting and summarizing the 
Convention.  In addition, at the international level, the ITU has 
taken a leading role in collecting and synthesizing experience 
regarding cybercrime legislation in its Guide and Toolkit.91 
The ITU in conjunction with other partners took the leading 
role in organizing the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS),92 which was held in two phases: in Geneva in 2003 and 
Tunis in 2005.  Governments, policy-makers, and experts from 
around the world shared ideas and experiences about how best to 
address the emerging issues associated with the development of a 
global information society, including the development of 
compatible standards and laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91. See INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, CYBERSECURITY GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (2007), available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/publications/2007
/cgdc-2007-e.pdf. 
 92. See generally WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (providing links 
and information on the WSIS). 
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The outputs of the Summit are contained in the Geneva 
Declaration of Principles,93 the Geneva Plan of Action,94 the Tunis 
Commitment,95 and the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society.96  
Under the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, the ITU was 
entrusted to take the lead as the sole facilitator for WSIS Action 
Line B5: “Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs 
[information and communication technologies].”97  The ITU 
Secretary General launched the Global Cybersecurity Agenda 
(GCA) in May 2007 as a global framework for dialogue and 
international cooperation aimed at proposing strategies to enhance 
security in the Information Society. 
c. The Commonwealth 
In an effort to harmonize computer-related criminal law in the 
Commonwealth countries,98 experts gathered to present a model 
law at the Commonwealth Conference of Ministers in 2002.  
Importantly, the model law, titled the Computer and Computer 
Related Crimes Bill,99 shares the same framework as the Convention 
to limit conflicting guidance.  It serves as an example of common 
principles each country can use to adapt framework legislation 
compatible with other Commonwealth countries. 
 
 
 
 93. See World Summit on the Info. Soc’y, Declaration of Principles, Doc. No. 
WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (Dec. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Geneva Declaration of 
Principles], available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-
WSIS-DOC-0004!!PDF-E.pdf. 
 94. See World Summit on the Info. Soc’y, Plan of Action, Doc. No. WSIS-
03/GENEVA/DOC/5-E (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis
/docs/geneva/official/poa.html. 
 95. See World Summit on the Info. Soc’y, Tunis Commitment, Doc. No. WSIS-
05/TUNIS/DOC/7-E (Nov. 18, 2005), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis
/docs2/tunis/off/7.html. 
 96. See World Summit on the Info. Soc’y, Tunis Agenda for the Information 
Society, Doc. No. WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E (Nov. 18, 2005), available at 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html. 
 97. Geneva Declaration of Principles, supra note 93, at 5. 
 98. See generally COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, http://www.thecommonwealth.org 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2011) (providing information on the Commonwealth, 
including a list of the member states). 
 99. COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, MODEL LAW ON COMPUTER AND COMPUTER 
RELATED CRIME (2002), available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org
/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BDA109CD2-5204-4FAB-AA77-
86970A639B05%7D_Computer%20Crime.pdf. 
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A later Meeting of Senior Officials of Commonwealth Law 
Ministers was held in October 2007 to address laws to combat 
terrorism and money-laundering, which included discussion on 
cybersecurity and cybercrime. 
d. The United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime (CTOC) 
The CTOC was adopted by General Assembly Resolution 
55/25 on November 15, 2000 and it came into force on September 
29, 2003.100  It is the main international instrument in the fight 
against transnational organized crime and seeks to promote 
international cooperation to prevent and combat transnational 
organized crime more effectively.  Here, it merits noting that the 
CoE Convention is aimed principally at strengthening internal law 
regarding cybercrimes, while the CTOC Conventions is aimed 
generally at cross border criminal activity. 
Although the CTOC Convention does not provide a single, 
agreed upon definition of organized crime per se, its provisions do 
provide elements of a concept of organized crime.  For instance: 
• An organized criminal group is defined as three or more 
persons working together to commit one or more serious 
crimes in order to obtain financial or other material benefit. 
• Transnational crimes are defined as: 
 offenses committed in more than one State; 
 offenses committed in one State, but a substantial part 
of preparation, planning, direction, or control takes 
place in another; 
 offenses committed in one State, but involving an 
organized criminal group that engages in criminal 
activities in more than one State; and 
 offenses committed in one State, but having substantial 
effects in another State. 
• Serious crime is defined as conduct constituting an offense 
punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least 
four years or a more serious penalty. 
 
 
 100. See United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and Its 
Protocols, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org
/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). 
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e. United Nations System Decisions, Resolutions, and 
Recommendations 
Some additional relevant United Nations system decisions, 
resolutions, and recommendations include101: 
• The United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice (CCPCJ)102 2007—Resolution 16/2 of April 
2007 on Effective crime prevention and criminal justice responses to 
combat sexual exploitation of children (notably, paragraphs 7 and 
16). 
• The United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC)103 Resolution E/2007/20 of July 26, 2007 on 
International cooperation in the prevention, investigation, prosecution 
and punishment of economic fraud and identity-related crime 
(E/2007/30 and E/2007 SR. 45). 
• ECOSOC Resolution 2004/26 of July 21, 2004 on International 
cooperation in the prevention, investigation, prosecution and 
punishment of fraud, the criminal misuse and falsification of identity 
and related crimes. 
• The Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges 
of the Twenty-first century (paragraph 18), endorsed by General 
Assembly Resolution 55/59 on December 4, 2000, and 
paragraph 36 of Plan of action for the implementation of the Vienna 
Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the 
Twenty-first century annexed to, and noted by, General Assembly 
Resolution 56/261 of January 31, 2002. 
• The Bangkok Declaration on Synergies and Responses: Strategic 
Alliances in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (paragraphs 15 
and 16), endorsed by General Assembly Resolution 60/177 of 
December 16, 2005. 
• Recommendations of an ad hoc Congress Workshop on 
Measures to Combat Computer-Related Crime.  Paragraph 2 of 
General Assembly Resolution 60/177 invited governments to 
implement all the recommendations adopted by the Eleventh 
Congress. 
 
 
 101. This list is non-exhaustive. 
 102. See The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, UNITED NATIONS 
OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions
/CCPCJ/index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
 103. See UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL, http://www.un.org
/ecosoc (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). 
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/10
  
2011] CYBERSECURITY LEGAL ISSUES 1779 
• General Assembly Resolutions 55/63 of December 4, 2000 and 
56/121 of December 19, 2001 on Combating the criminal misuse 
of information technologies.  This latter resolution invites Member 
States, when developing national law, policy, and practice, to 
combat the criminal misuse of information technologies and 
to take into account, inter alia, the work and achievements of 
the CCPCJ. 
• Various resolutions by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs,104 
including Resolution 48/5105 on Strengthening international 
cooperation in order to prevent the use of the Internet to commit drug-
related crime and Commission on Narcotic Drugs Resolution 
43/8106 of 15 March 2000 on the Internet.  ECOSOC 
Resolution 2004/42 also addresses the Sale of internationally 
controlled illicit drugs to individuals via the Internet. 
• Paragraph 17 of the General Assembly Resolution 60/178 of 
December 16, 2005 on International cooperation against the world 
drug problem. 
• ECOSOC Resolution 2004/42 on the Sale of internationally 
controlled illicit drugs to individuals via the Internet. 
 
Subsidiary bodies of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (e.g., 
the Sub-commission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in 
the Near and Middle-East and regional Heads of National Drug 
Law Enforcement Agencies (HONLEA) meetings) have also 
published relevant conclusions and recommendations.  
Additionally, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) 
published recommendations in its annual report for 2005 to curb 
the spread of illicit sales of controlled substances over the Internet, 
particularly pharmaceutical preparations. 
 
 
 
 104. See The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & 
CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
 105. See E.S.C. Res. 48/5 (2005), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf
/resolutions/cnd_2005_48-5.pdf. 
 106. See E.S.C. Res. 43/8 (Mar. 15, 2000), available at http://www.unodc.org
/documents/commissions/CND-Res-2000-until-present/CND-2000-
Session43/CND-Resolution-43-08.pdf. 
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2. Other Regional Experience 
Regional experience can also inform the debate.  In that 
regard, several regional sources are highlighted here. 
a. The League of Arab States 
Several countries in Southwest Asia and North and Northeast 
Africa comprising the League of Arab States (Arab League)107 have 
adopted cybercrime legislation, such as Tunisia,108 Saudi Arabia,109 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).110 
From a regional perspective, the recently concluded 
International Telecommunication Union Regional Cybersecurity Forum for 
Africa and Arab States111 held in Tunis, Tunisia in June 2009 
(attended by ITIDA) serves to highlight some of the main 
challenges faced by countries in the region in enhancing 
cybersecurity and securing critical information infrastructures.  
Importantly, it focused on the way forward for countries to 
strengthen their cybersecurity frameworks.112 
b. The African Union 
It is worth noting that the African Union’s (AU)113 March 2008 
Study on Harmonisation [sic] of Telecommunication, Information and 
Communication Technologies Policies and Regulation in Africa114 
 
 107. See LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, http://www.arableagueonline.org (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2011) (English website under construction). 
 108. See United Nations Econ. & Soc. Comm’n for W. Asia, Issues and 
Recommendations Related to Building Trust and Confidence in Online E-Services in the 
ESCWA Region 22 (2010) (“The Tunisian Cyber Security Legal Framework.”). 
 109. See News Archive, CYBERCRIME LAW, http://www.cybercrimelaw.net
/Archive.html (scroll down to “2006 October”) (last visited Mar. 13, 2011) (“Saudi 
Arabia has passed laws covering cybercrime. The Shoura Council has in October 
enacted provisions on illegal access, data interference, etc.”). 
 110. See The Prevention of Information Technology Crimes, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (2006), http://www.aecert.ae
/Prevention_of_Information_Technology_Crimes_English.pdf. 
 111. See 2009 ITU Regional Cybersecurity Forum for Africa and Arab States, INT’L 
TELECOMMS. UNION, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/events/2009/tunis/index.html 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
 112. See ITU Regional Cybersecurity Forum 2009, Draft Meeting Report, Doc. No. 
RFT/2009/01-E, June 8, 2009, available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/events
/2009/tunis/docs/tunis-cybersecurity-forum-report-june-09.pdf. 
 113. AFRICAN UNION, http://www.africa-union.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). 
 114. See AFRICAN UNION, STUDY ON HARMONISATION OF TELECOMMUNICATION, 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES POLICIES AND REGULATION IN 
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identified the need for member countries to combat cybercrimes.  
Many African countries have taken the initiative and forged ahead 
with legislation to address cybercrime and data protection. 
D. Institutional 
The institutional arrangements supporting cybersecurity are as 
varied and diverse as the approaches to the issues.  Two points 
merit noting at the outset.  First, there is no one-size-fits-all 
response to effective institutional design.  As will be demonstrated, 
institutional arrangements vary dramatically.  Second, as was 
mentioned in Section II, not all cybersecurity issues have a specific 
institutional dimension.  The most obvious one is the area of 
cybercrime, where practice indicates that issues of cybercrime, once 
passed into legislation, are usually within the purview of the police 
and the courts. 
Briefly, there are the substantive areas that do lend themselves 
to special institutional arrangements, especially CIIP (usually 
through CERTs) and data privacy protection (here practice is 
highly divergent). 
CERTs, described in section III.A.1, are one of the main 
responses to protecting infrastructure.115  In some countries 
(ArCERT in Argentina,116 the Canadian Cyber Incident Response 
Center (CCIRC),117 MyCERT in Malaysia,118 SingCERT in 
Singapore,119 the Electronic Communications Security–Computer 
Security Incident Response Team in South Africa (ECS-CSIRT),120 
and tunCERT in Tunisia121), CERTs take on a formal institutional 
 
AFRICA: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2008), available at http://www.africa-union.org
/root/UA/conferences/2008/mai/ie/11-14mai/executivesummary%20study
%20on%20telecom%20policy%2031%20mars.pdf. 
 115. For an alphabetical list of CERTS, see First Members, FIRST, 
http://www.first.org/members/teams/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
 116. ArCERT, FIRST, http://www.first.org/members/teams/arcert/ (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
 117. CCIRC, FIRST, http://www.first.org/members/teams/ccirc/ (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2011). 
 118. MyCERT, FIRST, http://www.first.org/members/teams/mycert/ (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
 119. SingCERT, FIRST, http://www.first.org/members/teams/singcert/ (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
 120. ECS-CSIRT, FIRST, http://www.first.org/members/teams/ecs-csirt/ (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
 121. tunCERT, FIRST, http://www.first.org/members/teams/tuncert/ (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
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role.  These national CERTs also have various institutional 
reporting roles.  ArCERT reports to the President through the 
National Office for IT.  In Canada, CCIRC reports to the Prime 
Minister.  MyCERT reports to the Prime Minister through the 
Ministry of Science.  SingCERT reports to the Ministry of 
Information through the Infocomm Development Authority of 
Singapore (IDA).  ECS-CERT I in South Africa reports to the 
President through the Minister of Data Secretary.  tunCERT 
reports to the Ministry of Communications Technologies through 
the National Agency for Computer Security. 
In terms of privacy, a number of examples demonstrate the 
wide practice of institutional responses: 
• Argentina.  In Argentina, the National Data Protection 
Directorate (NDPD) established under the Personal Data 
Protection Act is responsible for digital data protection.122  The 
NDPD is under the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. 
• Canada.  In Canada, at the federal level, the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA) assigns its oversight and enforcement role to the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) which 
reports to Parliament. 
• European Union.  In the E.U., generally, each country has a 
Data Protection Agency (DPA) principally responsible for the 
interpretation and enforcement of data privacy violations.  
Each DPA is typically an independent agency, with the 
authority to enforce against other government entities.  For 
those E.U. member states with a criminal component to data 
protection legislation, national or regional prosecutors may be 
engaged by the DPA for particular matters.  In addition, at the 
E.U. level, there is a Working Party on Data Protection that 
determines which countries are compliant with the Directives. 
• Malaysia.  In Malaysia, processing of personal data is regulated 
by the Personal Data Protection Act 2009 (PDPA).  The 
Personal Data Protection Commissioner is appointed by the 
Ministry of Information, Culture, and Communications and is 
in charge of implementing and enforcing the personal data 
protection laws in Malaysia. 
 
 122. Argentina Personal Data Protection Act (2000), PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 
30, 2000), http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd%5B347%5D=
x-347-61939 (providing an English translation of the Argentina Personal Data 
Protection Act (2000)). 
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• Singapore.  Singapore is an interesting case.  There is no 
overarching data protection or privacy law in Singapore.  
However, there are several industry-specific laws that deal with 
data protection and privacy issues and that may be enforced by 
industry regulatory bodies.  In addition, while the Constitution 
of Singapore does not contain any explicit right to privacy, the 
High Court has ruled that personal information may be 
protected under a duty of confidence.  Nevertheless, the 
government of Singapore has been considering passing a 
comprehensive data protection act for more than ten years 
now.123 
• South Africa.  In South Africa, the Protection of Personal 
Information Act (PPIA) requires that personal information 
may only be processed by a responsible party that has notified 
the information Protection Regulator (Regulator), which 
reports to the President of South Africa. 
• Tunisia.  In Tunisia, the Act on Protection of Personal Data 
established the National Authority for Protection of Personal 
Data (NAPPD).  The NAPPD reports to the Ministry of Human 
Rights. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL, NATIONAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
RESPONSES124 
A. Promoting International Cooperation on Cybersecurity 
No nation-state can achieve adequate cybersecurity on its own; 
international coordination and cooperation must be part of the 
response. 
Some believe that an international treaty is needed on some or 
all aspects of the cybersecurity problem.  And in many cases, this 
clarion call relates to issues of “cyber-war” and arises in a number of 
fora.125  As noted above, NATO issued an experts’ report, “NATO 
 
 123. PHR2006—Republic of Singapore, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL (Dec. 18, 2007), 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-559494 
(displaying Privacy International’s 2007 report on Singapore). 
 124. Having undertaken a brief substantive review of the themes and 
responsible institutions/organizations, this section provides a brief glimpse into 
some current responses to these issues. 
 125. In January 2010, Hamadoun Toure, former ITU Secretary General, 
proposed at the World Economic Forum in Davos that the world’s nations should 
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2020: Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a 
New Strategic Concept for NATO,” which included 
recommendations for changes in the NATO Strategic Concept to 
specify the characteristics of a cyber attack that would trigger the 
obligation of collective response under Section 5 of the NATO 
treaty.126  The report contains the following blunt statements: 
NATO must accelerate efforts to respond to the danger of 
cyber attacks by protecting its own communications and 
command systems, helping Allies to improve their ability 
to prevent and recover from attacks, and developing an 
array of cyber defence [sic] capabilities aimed at effective 
detection and deterrence. 
. . . . 
The most probable threats to Allies in the coming decade 
are unconventional.  Three in particular stand out: 1) an 
attack by ballistic missile (whether or not nuclear-armed); 
2) strikes by international terrorist groups; and 3) cyber 
assaults of varying degrees of severity. . . . 
. . . . 
The Alliance should consider giving the Secretary General 
or NATO military leaders certain pre-delegated 
authorities, based on agreed rules-of-engagement, to 
respond in an emergency situation such as a missile or 
cyber attack. 
. . . . 
The next significant attack on the Alliance may well come 
down a fibre [sic] optic cable.  Already, cyber attacks 
against NATO systems occur frequently, but most often 
below the threshold of political concern.  However, the 
risk of a large-scale attack on NATO’s command and 
 
adopt a treaty in which they would engage not to make the first cyber strike against 
another nation.  The ensuing debate revealed a considerable lack of clarity over 
what cyber-war is and what responses are appropriate for nation states to exercise.  
The fundamental issue is how does the “law of war”—including such core issues as 
necessity and proportionality and the very definition of “war” itself—apply to 
cyberspace.  For example, assuming that use of force was otherwise justified, when 
would it be appropriate to attack the systems (SCADA) that control electrical and 
power infrastructure, and would it be necessary or even possible to distinguish 
between military (combatant) targets and civilian (non-combatant) targets?  What 
would be the implications and what would be the proper range of responses if one 
nation state were to distribute against another the Stuxnet virus, which attacks 
SCADA systems?  What issues surround use by a nation state of non-governmental 
proxies, such as bot-net operators, to conduct cyber-attacks? 
 126. NATO 2020: ASSURED SECURITY; DYNAMIC ENGAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 9. 
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control systems or energy grids could readily warrant 
consultations under Article 4 and could possibly lead to 
collective defence [sic] measures under Article 5. . . .  
[T]here persist serious gaps in NATO’s cyber defence 
[sic] capabilities.  The Strategic Concept should place a 
high priority on addressing these vulnerabilities, which 
are both unacceptable and increasingly dangerous.127 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides that “[n]othing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence [sic] if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations. . . .”128  The application of Article 
51 with respect to cyber-war has been hotly debated in the 
academic literature without any firm conclusions being drawn.129 
When analyzing the merits of a treaty-based approach to 
cybersecurity, a myriad of questions arise, including: What are the 
key issues that should or could be addressed in a cybersecurity 
treaty?  What would be the added value of such a treaty?  What 
would be the risks?  What prior efforts have been attempted and 
what caused them to fail or have limited effect?  What incremental 
steps can be taken to break through the problems?  How can treaty 
compliance be verified?  How could countries globally be 
supported in the strengthening of their cybersecurity capacities, 
through technical assistance and other means? 
Any effort to reach international consensus on cybersecurity is 
likely to expose a range of concerns, which in part flow from 
different visions of national security, of the role and value of the 
 
 127. Id. at 11, 17, 35, 45. 
 128. U.N. Charter art. 51, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents
/charter/chapter7.shtml. 
 129. See Jon P. Jurich, Cyberwar and Customary International Law: The Potential of a 
“Bottom-up” Approach to an International Law of Information Operations, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
275 (2008) (discussing the merits of a realist view of customary international law 
formation as a means of coping with the potential harms associated with modern 
information operations); Glen R. Shilland, Influencing and Exploiting Behavioral 
Norms in Cyberspace to Promote Ethical and Moral Conduct of Cyberwarfare (June 
2010) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Air University), available at 
https://www.afresearch.org/skins/RIMS/home.aspx (enter article title in search 
window and follow hyperlink to source) (exploring the interaction of the law of 
armed conflict with cyberspace behavioral norms and suggesting avenues to 
influence these norms in order to facilitate ethical and moral cyberwarfare); Sharon 
R. Stevens, Internet War Crimes Tribunals and Security in an Interconnected World, 18 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 657 (2009), http://www.uiowa.edu
/~tlcp/TLCP%20Articles/18-3/stevens.finalfinal.me.mlb.100109.pdf (arguing 
that international law is insufficient to address cyber attacks). 
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Internet, of human rights, and of economic policy.  Some see 
cybersecurity as having state security at its core, which leads to an 
emphasis on capabilities to monitor and attribute transmissions 
and to block any undesirable content.  Others strongly believe that 
Internet governance (including Internet security) involves the 
integrating and balancing of interests, including not only national 
security, but also human rights and the economic and 
developmental interests associated with a vibrant, innovative, and 
competitive ICT sector.  These differing perspectives manifest 
themselves in many areas, including, for example, the increasing 
debate over the issue of “attribution,” referred to above.  One 
contribution to reconciling these interests is the 2009 
recommendation of the European Parliament on strengthening 
security and fundamental freedoms on the Internet.130 
Various proposals are emerging for improving regional and 
international cooperation, including the following: 
• The Council of Europe has started work to explore the shared 
responsibilities of states to take reasonable measures through 
multi-lateral cooperation “to ensure the ongoing functioning 
of the Internet and, in consequence, of the delivery of the 
public service . . . to which all persons under their jurisdiction 
are entitled.”131  In this connection, the competent 
intergovernmental cooperation body, the CoE Steering 
Committee on the Media and New Communication Services 
(CDMC), has been asked by the CoE Committee of Ministers 
to give priority attention to the elaboration of legal 
instruments designed (i) to preserve or reinforce the 
protection of the cross-border flow of Internet traffic and (ii) 
to protect resources which are critical for the ongoing 
functioning and borderless nature and integrity of the 
Internet (i.e. critical Internet resources). 
• It was reported recently that Korea is attempting to present 
computer security as a topic of discussion for the Group of 20 
meetings in Seoul later this year.  Korea reportedly wants to 
 
 130. Strengthening Security and Fundamental Freedoms on the Internet, EUR. 
PARL. DOC. INI/2008/2160 (2009), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides
/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0194+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
 131. 1st Council of Europe Conference of Ministers Responsible for Media 
and New Communication Services, Resolution: Internet Governance and Critical 
Internet Resources, in A NEW NOTION OF MEDIA? 9, 10 (May 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/MCM%282009%29011_en
_final_web.pdf. 
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include on the summit agenda discussion of establishing an 
international body for combating cybercrime.132 
• In March 2009, the E.U. Commission issued a communication 
on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP), 
entitled “Protecting Europe from large scale cyber-attacks and 
disruptions: enhancing preparedness, security and 
resilience.”133  It noted that the challenges for Europe are: (1) 
uneven and uncoordinated national approaches; (2) need for 
a new European governance model for Critical Information 
Infrastructures; (3) limited European early warning and 
incident response capability; and (4) need for appropriate 
international cooperation.  With respect to international 
cooperation, the communication spoke of “engaging the 
global community to develop a set of principles, reflecting 
European core values, for Internet resilience and stability, in 
the framework of our strategic dialogue and cooperation with 
third countries and international organisations [sic].” 134 
• In April 2009, the E.U. held a Ministerial Conference on 
CIIP.135 
• The Organization of American States has undertaken a 
number of steps to enhance cybersecurity and improve 
regional responses to cybercrime.136 
• One structure in Europe for improving coordination is the 
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), 
founded in 2004.137  ENISA planned the first pan-European 
CIIP exercise that took place in November 2010.  The exercise 
 
 132. See Kim Tong-hyung, Korea Trying to Put Cyber Security on G20 Agenda, THE 
KOREA TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2010
/11/123_70876.html. 
 133. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Critical 
Information Infrastructure Protection: “Protecting Europe from Large Scale Cyber-Attacks 
and Disruptions Enhancing Preparedness, Security, and Resilience,” at 7, SEC (2009), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/nis/docs/comm_ciip
/comm_en.pdf. 
 134.  Id. at 7. 
 135. See Valérie Andrianavaly, EU Policy on Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection—CIIP (June 19, 2009), available at http://sta.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pdf
/scni/ExperimentalPlatforms/1-CIIP_INFSO_WS%2020090619.pdf. 
 136. See Inter-American Cooperation Portal on Cyber-Crime, ORGANIZATION OF 
AMERICAN STATES, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyber.htm (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2011). 
 137. About ENISA, EUROPEAN NETWORK AND INFO. SEC. AGENCY, 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/about-enisa (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
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tested the efficiency of communication between different 
Member States in case of incidents affecting Internet’s normal 
operation in all participating countries. 
• Recently a group of governmental experts from fifteen 
countries agreed on a set of recommendations on 
cybersecurity.138 
All of these recent examples raise important questions, 
including: What are the best venues for improving international 
cooperation?  What is the role of intergovernmental organizations, 
such as the ITU, UNCITRAL, or the U.N. itself?  What is the role of 
regional organizations, such as the African Union, APEC, the 
Council of Europe, the E.U., NATO, or the OAS?  What is the role 
of the international business community and civil society globally?  
What incremental steps can be taken to advance cooperation? 
B. Structuring National Responses 
While international cooperation is necessary, each nation will 
have to develop, as a foundation, its own national cybersecurity 
strategy, authorities, and capabilities.  Within any given nation 
state, adequate cybersecurity will require effective coordination and 
cooperation among governmental entities on the national and sub-
national levels as well as the private sector and civil society. 
Issues for consideration include: What are the most effective 
means to promote effective coordination and cooperation at the 
national level?  To what extent should cooperation of the private 
sector be legally compelled?  What incentives or subsidies may 
promote cooperation?  How far should governments go in 
regulating the private sector in the name of improving 
cybersecurity?  What is the role of civil liability systems in 
addressing cyber-vulnerabilities? 
As governments seek to develop their own national policies 
and structures for cybersecurity, questions include: Which agency 
or ministry should have the lead?  What should be the role of 
civilian agencies versus national security agencies?  What should be 
the roles of law enforcement or national security agencies versus 
the roles of ministries for trade, commerce, or communications? 
 
 
 138. See John Markoff, Step Taken to End Impasse Over Cypersecurity Talks, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 16, 2010, at A7, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/world
/17cyber.html?_r=1. 
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One example of a national strategy for cybersecurity is the 
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) 
developed by the U.S.139  It is important to note that most elements 
of the U.S. plan focus on getting the federal government’s own 
cybersecurity house in order.  The U.S. has not decided what 
should be the regulatory authority of the federal government in 
protecting critical infrastructures owned and operated by the 
private sector.  Pending legislation may clarify that role later this 
year.  Another example is the European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection set forth in the “EU COM (2006) 786” 
directive, which obligates all member states to adopt the 
components of the Programme into their national statutes.  The 
Programme also applied to the European Economic Area.140 
One element of almost any cybersecurity strategy at the 
governmental or corporate level is the development and 
deployment of intrusion detection systems that monitor a given 
network for unauthorized traffic and malicious content.  Key issues 
include whether an intrusion detection system for governmental 
networks should be extended to privately owned networks or 
whether the private sector should manage its own intrusion 
detection systems.  If the answer in a particular nation is that an 
intrusion detection system for governmental networks should be 
extended to at least some more critical privately owned networks, 
the next question is on what principles is that category delineated.  
This issue also often leads to consideration of the role of national 
security or military agencies versus civilian agencies. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A WAY FORWARD 
Having set the stage in Sections I and II, providing an overview 
of substantive issues of cybersecurity in Section III, and briefly 
outlining some international and national responses in Section IV, 
this Section proposes some additional thoughts for advancing the 
evolution of the international legal enabling environment for 
cybersecurity. 
 
 
 139. Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, supra note 36. 
 140. See Communication from the Commission: On a European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, COM (2006) 786 final (Dec. 12, 2006), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0786en01.pdf. 
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It is recognized, of course, that there are existing mechanisms 
and instruments of international cooperation on legal issues of 
cybersecurity among which the Council of Europe’s Budapest 
Convention is primary.  In this article, the authors suggest three 
main ideas towards an evolving international best practice legal 
approach to cybersecurity: First, an approach that deconstructs 
matters of cybersecurity.  Second, an approach that looks at issues 
of cybersecurity in a modular way.  And third, that these 
deconstructionist and modular approaches provide a new lens 
through which to look at how to enhance future international 
cooperation and collaboration. 
Part of the deconstruction and modular approach advocated 
here is aimed at clarifying what exactly is meant by use of the catch-
all phrase, “cybersecurity.”  Cybersecurity does not necessarily 
mean cybercrime, which does not necessarily mean cyber-war.  
Threats to cybersecurity come from a number of sources, including 
outdated legal architecture that doesn’t necessarily reflect or apply 
well to the Internet and a dissonance of policy and legislative 
approaches by countries that make international collaboration and 
cooperation on certain levels difficult.  In addition, “buggy code,” 
bad practice, and simple human error, as well as natural disasters 
can thwart such efforts and contribute to cyber-insecurity. 
So, going forward, what can be done to approach these new 
issues of cooperation?  First, it is suggested that policy-makers and 
legislators adopt at the same time a more modular and a layered 
approach to the many complex and often intertwined questions of 
cybersecurity.  Deconstruction begins by recognizing the manifold 
layers affected and tailoring security approaches to each layer.  
Those layers could include the infrastructure layer, the protocol or 
software layer, and the applications layer.  In addition, a more 
resilience-based approach is emerging as the bellwether approach 
instead of a “perimeter” security approach.  Finally, a better and 
more realistic understanding of the incentives of the different 
actors involved is required, including economic and personal 
incentives.  Institutionally, attention needs to be paid to building 
capacity, especially for law enforcement personnel and by 
harnessing the expertise of the private sector and other industry 
players at the various levels through engagement with the private 
sector, possibly through innovative public-private partnership 
mechanisms. 
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In analyzing and addressing the complex, multidimensional 
tapestry of international cybersecurity legal issues, the following is a 
synthesis of factors to be taken into consideration141: 
• Deconstructionalist (layered) approach.  Cybersecurity is not a 
monolith and responses to cyber-threats do not come in a 
“one-size-fits-all” package.  Rather, the analysis of threats to 
cybersecurity, as well as the responses to them, needs to be 
looked at both in a deconstructed and modular fashion. 
• Resilience vs. perimeter security.  Concepts of security based on 
“securing the perimeter” applicable in past decades to closed 
systems should be reviewed in favor of concepts of security 
based on resilience (flexibility of response to type of threat 
and ability to recover and adjust more quickly to changing 
threat environments). 
• Identify incentives.  A range of incentives (including economic 
and behavioral incentives) exist that should be (1) understood 
and (2) employed in the design of security response systems.  
This could even include identifying innovative incentives to 
change behavior of users, such as an insurance market that 
could accurately price the risk of security. 
• Fully implement existing instruments.  Many tools, instruments, 
and good practices are already available to help societies cope 
with cybercrime, including the Budapest Convention, but 
these need to be fully implemented and applied. 
• Increase awareness and build capacity.  These are especially 
needed in the case of policy-makers, legislators, regulators, 
and law enforcement personnel. 
• Ensure cybersecurity needs are adequately resourced.  (See above). 
• Create cybersecurity accountability.  In some countries, an 
accountable cybersecurity “czar” is named, but in others, or in 
systems with diffuse accountability, lack of clear identification 
of responsibility can lead to vulnerability. 
• Law reform.  Here, there are three areas meriting attention: 
First, in developing countries, a robust, comprehensive law 
reform component should be included in development 
projects.  Second, national laws should be drafted with a view 
towards achieving, if not harmonization, interoperability 
 
 141. This list of factors is derived from the discussion of the panelists at the 
Workshop.  For details of the discussion that gave rise to this synthetic list, see, for 
example, Transcript, supra note 10. 
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across borders.  And third, international law responses can 
provide for improvements of the functioning, stability, and 
resilience of the Internet. 
• Sovereignty issues may require re-examining existing concepts of the 
“State.” 
• Use of PPP models and approaches.  Recognizing that no country 
or entity can address cybersecurity alone, governments should 
be encouraged to work with industry and civil society in 
addressing cybersecurity needs.  Indeed, the private sector, 
since it owns much of the infrastructure and since it has 
resources and incentives for security, should be actively 
engaged, perhaps through a variety of public-private 
partnership models. 
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